



# **A Collection of Methods for Racial Profiling Analysis**

Greg Ridgeway  
RAND Safety & Justice Program  
Santa Monica, CA

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# ***Racial profiling is a growing concern***

## Introduction

### ❖ Racial profiling is a growing concern

- ❖ Analytic quality is weak
- ❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?
- ❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?
- ❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?
- ❖ A new approach

## Bias in the decision to stop

## Internal benchmarking

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- I-95 “turnpike” studies in the mid-1990s raised public concern about racial profiling
- Public concern has led to state and local-level action
  - ❖ At least 26 states have passed legislation
  - ❖ Hundreds of other localities collect data; some compelled by the Justice Department
- Congress considering the End of Racial Profiling Act mandating data collection to receive Federal funds
- Should officers use racial profiling?
  - ❖ Tenth Circuit: “unequal application of criminal law to white and black persons was one of the central evils addressed by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment”

# *Analytic quality is weak*

## Introduction

❖ Racial profiling is a growing concern

❖ Analytic quality is weak

❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?

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❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?

❖ A new approach

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Summary

- A growing number of studies claim racial profiling based on analysis of data collected
  - ❖ **Texas:** Concluded that “75% of agencies stop more black and Latino drivers than white drivers”
- And some studies hastily conclude no profiling occurs based on analyzed data
  - ❖ **Sacramento:**  
$$\frac{\% \text{ black drivers stopped}}{\% \text{ black crime suspect descriptions}}$$

# *Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?*

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- ❖ Analytic quality is weak
- ❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?
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Racial Distribution of People Stopped

Racial Distribution of People at Risk of Being Stopped

# Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?

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- ❖ Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?
- ❖ A new approach


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Summary

Racial Distribution of People Stopped



Racial Distribution of People at Risk of Being Stopped

# Why is testing for racial profiling so hard?

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
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
Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

**Racial Distribution of People Stopped**



**Racial Distribution of Residents According to the Census**



- The difference may result from:
  - ❖ A race bias
  - ❖ Car ownership, time on the road, and care
  - ❖ Exposure to police

# A new approach

## Introduction

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## ❖ A new approach


## Bias in the decision to stop

## Internal benchmarking

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- Gauge department wide racial bias in the decision to stop
- Identify potential problem officers with internal benchmarking
- Assess racial bias in post-stop activity with propensity scores





# Step #1: Bias in the decision to stop

## Introduction

### Bias in the decision to stop

#### ❖ Central question

- ❖ Simple veil of darkness test
- ❖ Adjusting for “clock time”
- ❖ Development of the test
- ❖ Accommodate underreporting
- ❖ Decomposition of the race effect
- ❖ Results
- ❖ Results

## Internal benchmarking

### Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

Grogger & Ridgeway (2006). “Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from Behind a Veil of Darkness,” *JASA* 101(475):878-887.

**Central question:** Does an officer’s ability to identify race of driver in advance influence which drivers he stops?

- The ability to discriminate requires officers identifying the race in advance (e.g. Goldin & Rouse, bias in orchestra auditions)
- The ability to identify race in advance of the stop decreases as it becomes dark
- We directly test whether the ability to identify the race affects the race distribution of the stopped drivers

# Simple veil of darkness test

## Introduction

### Bias in the decision to stop

#### ❖ Central question

#### ❖ Simple veil of darkness test

#### ❖ Adjusting for “clock time”

#### ❖ Development of the test

#### ❖ Accommodate underreporting

#### ❖ Decomposition of the race effect

#### ❖ Results


#### ❖ Results

## Internal benchmarking

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- CPD officers stop a greater proportion of black drivers at night than during the day
- This is counter to the racial profiling hypothesis



# Adjusting for “clock time”

## Introduction


### Bias in the decision to stop

- ❖ Central question
- ❖ Simple veil of darkness test
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- ❖ Development of the test
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- ❖ Results
- ❖ Results

### Internal benchmarking

### Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary



# Development of the test

## Introduction

### Bias in the decision to stop

- ❖ Central question
- ❖ Simple veil of darkness test
- ❖ Adjusting for “clock time”

### Development of the test

- ❖ Accommodate underreporting
- ❖ Decomposition of the race effect
- ❖ Results
- ❖ Results

### Internal benchmarking

### Assessing race bias post-stop

### Summary

- In the absence of a race bias  $K(t) = 1$

$$\frac{P(S|B, t, d = 0)}{P(S|\bar{B}, t, d = 0)} = K(t) \frac{P(S|B, t, d = 1)}{P(S|\bar{B}, t, d = 1)}$$

- Bayes' Theorem and some algebra yield

$$K(t) = \frac{P(B|S, t, d = 0)}{P(\bar{B}|S, t, d = 0)} \frac{P(\bar{B}|S, t, d = 1)}{P(B|S, t, d = 1)} \\ \frac{P(\bar{B}|t, d = 0)}{P(B|t, d = 0)} \frac{P(B|t, d = 1)}{P(\bar{B}|t, d = 1)}$$

# Accommodate underreporting

## Introduction

### Bias in the decision to stop

- ❖ Central question
- ❖ Simple veil of darkness test
- ❖ Adjusting for “clock time”
- ❖ Development of the test

### Accommodate underreporting

### Decomposition of the race effect

- ❖ Results
- ❖ Results

### Internal benchmarking

### Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- There is some potential underreporting

$$P(B|S, t, d) = \frac{P(B|R, S, t, d)P(R|S, t, d)}{P(R|B, S, t, d)}$$

$$\log K(t) =$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \log \frac{P(B|R, S, t, d=0)}{1 - P(B|R, S, t, d=0)} - \log \frac{P(B|R, S, t, d=1)}{1 - P(B|R, S, t, d=1)} + \\ & \log \frac{P(\bar{B}|t, d=0)}{P(B|t, d=0)} \frac{P(B|t, d=1)}{P(\bar{B}|t, d=1)} + \\ & \log \frac{P(R|\bar{B}, S, t, d=0)}{P(R|\bar{B}, S, t, d=1)} \frac{P(R|B, S, t, d=1)}{P(R|B, S, t, d=0)} \end{aligned}$$

# Decomposition of the race effect

## Introduction

### Bias in the decision to stop

- ❖ Central question
- ❖ Simple veil of darkness test
- ❖ Adjusting for “clock time”
- ❖ Development of the test
- ❖ Accommodate underreporting

### ❖ Decomposition of the race effect

- ❖ Results
- ❖ Results

### Internal benchmarking

### Assessing race bias post-stop

### Summary

$$\log K(t) = \text{stop distribution} + \text{exposure} + \text{reporting}$$

- We can estimate the stop ratio using logistic regression

$$\log \frac{P(B|R, S, d, t)}{1 - P(B|R, S, d, t)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 d + g(t)$$

- $g(t)$  is some flexible function of  $t$  (e.g.  $t + t^2 + t^3$ )
- Assume exposure term is 0
- Assume reporting term is 0
- $\log K(t) = -\beta_1$

# Results: VoD estimates of bias, all months

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop

- ❖ Central question
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- ❖ Accommodate underreporting
- ❖ Decomposition of the race effect

## ❖ Results

## ❖ Results

## Internal benchmarking

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

Year	$K(t)$	95% interval	N
2003	1.01	(0.88,1.16)	4,013
2004	0.98	(0.86,1.12)	4,589
2005	1.07	(0.98,1.16)	10,890
Combined	1.02	(0.95,1.09)	19,492

- Includes all stops during the evening intertwilight period

# Results: VoD estimates of bias, Daylight Savings Time

## Introduction

### Bias in the decision to stop

- ❖ Central question
- ❖ Simple veil of darkness test
- ❖ Adjusting for “clock time”
- ❖ Development of the test
- ❖ Accommodate underreporting
- ❖ Decomposition of the race effect
- ❖ Results

### ❖ Results

### Internal benchmarking

### Assessing race bias post-stop

### Summary

Year	$K(t)$	95% interval	N
2003	1.15	(0.79,1.68)	470
2004	1.19	(0.79,1.80)	403
2005	1.11	(0.81,1.52)	764
Combined	1.10	(0.91,1.33)	1,637

- Includes all stops occurring within four weeks of the spring or fall Daylight Saving Time change during the evening intertwilight period



# Step #2: Internal benchmarking

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop

## Internal benchmarking

### ❖ Central question

- ❖ Internal benchmark
- ❖ Propensity score weighting
- ❖ Common approach
- ❖ Estimating the false discovery rate

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- Consider a particular officer #534
- 71% of this officer's stops involve a black driver

		Percentage
Time	(12-4pm]	9
	(4-8pm]	57
	(8pm-12am]	34
Day	Mon	20
	Tue	12
	Wed	12
	⋮	⋮
Month	Jan	12
	Feb	14
	Mar	7
	Apr	6
	May	8
	⋮	⋮
Area	J	49
	K	33
	L	5
	M	11

# Internal benchmark

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop

## Internal benchmarking

### ❖ Central question

### ❖ Internal benchmark

### ❖ Propensity score weighting

### ❖ Common approach

### ❖ Estimating the false discovery rate

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- 46% of similarly situated stops made by other officers involved black drivers

		Percentage	Comparison
Time	(12-4pm]	9	9
	(4-8pm]	57	56
	(8pm-12am]	34	35
Day	Mon	20	20
	Tue	12	11
	Wed	12	12
	⋮	⋮	⋮
Month	Jan	12	12
	Feb	14	15
	Mar	7	7
	Apr	6	6
	May	8	7
	⋮	⋮	⋮
Area	J	49	48
	K	33	34
	L	5	5
	M	11	11

# Propensity score weighting

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop

## Internal benchmarking

### ❖ Central question

### ❖ Internal benchmark

### ❖ Propensity score weighting

### ❖ Common approach

### ❖ Estimating the false discovery rate

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- Reweight stops that other officers made so that they have the same distribution of features

$$f(\mathbf{x}|t = 1) = w(\mathbf{x})f(\mathbf{x}|t = 0)$$

- Solving for  $w(\mathbf{x})$  yields the propensity score weight

$$w(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{f(t = 1|\mathbf{x})}{f(t = 0|\mathbf{x})}K = \frac{p(\mathbf{x})}{1 - p(\mathbf{x})}K$$

where  $p(\mathbf{x})$  is the probability that a stop with features  $\mathbf{x}$  involves the officer in question

- Estimate  $p(\mathbf{x})$  using a flexible, non-parametric version of logistic regression
- Compare the percentage of black drivers among the officer's stops with the weighted percentage of black drivers among other stops using weights

$$w_i = p(\mathbf{x}_i)/(1 - p(\mathbf{x}_i))$$

# Common approach

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop

## Internal benchmarking

### ❖ Central question

### ❖ Internal benchmark

### ❖ Propensity score weighting

### ❖ Common approach

### ❖ Estimating the false discovery rate

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- A common approach is to compute z-statistics for each officer

$$z = \frac{p_t - p_c}{\sqrt{\frac{p_t(1-p_t)}{n_t} + \frac{p_c(1-p_c)}{ESS}}}$$

- In the absence of racial bias this would be distributed  $N(0,1)$  and a cutoff of 2.0 would be reasonable
- With 133 officers and 133 correlated  $z$ s an appropriate reference distribution can be much wider (Efron 2006).

# Estimating the false discovery rate

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop


## Internal benchmarking

- ❖ Central question
- ❖ Internal benchmark
- ❖ Propensity score weighting
- ❖ Common approach
- ❖ Estimating the false discovery rate

## Assessing race bias post-stop

## Summary

- Estimate  $f_0(z)$  and  $f(z)$  from the observed  $z$ s
- Right tail consists of 5 officers with “problem officer” probabilities ranging from 70% to 86%



# Step #3: Assessing race bias

## post-stop

Introduction

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❖ Central question

❖ Reweighting balances the group

❖ Results: Cincinnati stop duration

❖ Results: Cincinnati search rates

Summary

G. Ridgeway (2006). “Assessing the effect of race bias in post-traffic stop outcomes using propensity scores,” *JQC* 22(1):1-29.

- **Central question:** Are black drivers more/less likely to be cited, have long stop durations, or be searched?

Stop feature	% Black drivers (N=3,703)	% Nonblack drivers (N=3,033)
Region		
A	32%	14%
Time of day		
12am-4am	16%	8%
Resident	76%	64%
Age		
18-29	47%	38%
Reason		
Mechanical/ Registration	26%	16%
Male	75%	74%

# Reweighting balances the group

## Introduction

## Bias in the decision to stop

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### ❖ Central question

### ❖ Reweighting balances the group

### ❖ Results: Cincinnati stop duration

### ❖ Results: Cincinnati search rates

## Summary

$$\bullet \quad w(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{P(\text{black}|\mathbf{x})}{1 - P(\text{black}|\mathbf{x})}$$

Stop feature	% Black drivers (N=3,703)	% Nonblack drivers weighted (ESS=1,689.2)	% Nonblack drivers (N=3,033)
Region			
A	32%	33%	14%
Time of day			
12am-4am	16%	16%	8%
Resident	76%	76%	64%
Age			
18-29	47%	48%	38%
Reason			
Mechanical/ Registration	26%	26%	16%
Male	75%	76%	74%

# Results: Cincinnati stop duration

## Introduction

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❖ Central question

❖ Reweighting balances the group

❖ Results:  
Cincinnati stop duration

❖ Results:  
Cincinnati search rates

Summary

Year	Stop Duration (Minutes)	Black Drivers	Nonblack (reweighted)	Nonblack (unweighted)
2003	$n =$ (0,10)	16,708 40%	4,881 43%	18,548 56%
2004	$n =$ (0,10)	18,721 40%	5,190 44%	20,390 59%
2005	$n =$ (0,10)	15,571 45%	4,965 47%	20,431 60%

- Black drivers in 2005 were three times more likely to have invalid licenses than white drivers (23% vs. 7%)



# Results: Cincinnati search rates

## Introduction

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❖ Central question

❖ Reweighting balances the group

❖ Results: Cincinnati stop duration

❖ Results: Cincinnati search rates

## Summary

Year	Discretion (Minutes)	Black Drivers	Nonblack (reweighted)	Nonblack (unweighted)
2003	$n =$	16,708	4,881	18,548
	High	5.9%	5.4%	2.8%
	Low	8.1%	5.5%	2.7%
2004	$n =$	18,721	5,190	20,390
	High	6.7%	6.2%	3.2%
	Low	10.7%	7.0%	3.9%
2005	$n =$	19,375	6,141	25,163
	High	6.1%	5.2%	2.8%
	Low	4.4%	3.5%	1.6%

- Hit rates for black and white drivers are about 28% for high discretion searches.

# Summary

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Summary

❖ Summary

❖ For more  
information

- Racial profiling analyses have generally confused the issue by studying irrelevant comparisons
- Credible and relevant comparisons are not difficult
  - ❖ Assess whether the ability to identify race in advance influences who gets stopped
  - ❖ Compare similarly situated officers
  - ❖ Equalize race groups on the obvious features on which they might legitimately differ

# *For more information*

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Summary

❖ Summary

❖ For more information

- Oakland 2003 report endorsed by OPD, the ACLU, the NAACP, and the Oakland CPRB
- Oakland Tribune reported “blacks are more likely than other races to be pulled over by police”
- Cincinnati Enquirer “Study: No bias in traffic stops, But many perceive discrimination based on race”

More available at <http://www.i-pensieri.com/gregr/rp.shtml> or Google “racial profiling analysis” or “Greg Ridgeway”